The epistemic value of rationality by Popp, Alexandru W. A.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The epistemic value of rationality
Alexandru W. A. Popp
APOC Services
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17618/
MPRA Paper No. 17618, posted 2. October 2009 10:15 UTC
1 
The Epistemic Value of Rationality 
Alexandru W. A. Popp 
APOC Services – Research and Development Division 
(1)+514-487-5229 
ALEXWPOPP@GMAIL.COM  
 
This research was presented at The 12th International Conference on Foundations and 
Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory, Rome, Italy; and Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory, Foggia, Italy. 
 
Abstract 
Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear 
description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, 
judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our 
definition, the game theoretic idealized principle of rationality becomes absolute. Our model gives 
a more precise account of the players, of their true behavior. We show that the Rational Method 
(RM) is the only process that can be used to achieve a specific goal. We also provide schematics of 
how information, beliefs, knowledge, actions, and purposes interact with and influence each other 
in order to achieve a specific goal. Furthermore, ration, the ability to think in the RM framework, 
is a singularity in time and space. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, different models and 
theories have now a common ground on which we can judge their soundness. 
 
Keywords: conceptual conglomerate, traditional rationality, rational method, 
ration 
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1. Introduction 
In order to have a proper analysis of different ‘problems’, one must have 
the appropriate tools. Rationality is one such tool exploited in rational choice 
theories, game theory, decision theory and others, that has been over-used and 
miss-used. Moreover, contemporary models of management utilize the hidden 
assumption that the actors involved are rational. However, there is no one true and 
clear definition of what rationality is. 
Our ideas and beliefs about the concept of rationality are not clear. 
Different models of rational choice use different definitions. Being an abstract 
concept, it is hard to pinpoint this term. This is the reason why this notion has 
been misinterpreted. Rationality is a super-system concept. It is a conceptual 
conglomerate (ConC)1, where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, 
experience, and pragmatism interact. Nevertheless, there is no one unified way for 
all the elements of this ConC to interact. The current models look only at partial 
interactions and they have limited descriptions. 
This paper will show what rationality really is, provide its functional 
definition, as well as its mathematical characterization. The first part of the paper 
focuses on previous work done on this topic. In this section, we describe the major 
aspects and we illustrate certain of the limitations of these models. We 
characterize Traditional Rationality (TR) as the basic idea of what is believed to 
be rational in major theories dealing with this concept, more precisely Game 
Theory and Rational Choice Theory. We show the constraints of the concepts of 
utility and equilibrium contained in TR. We also describe the standards of 
preferences and what expectations of future events are. 
In the second part of the paper, the Rational Method (RM) is described. 
We show what a goal is, and prove that the RM is the only way to achieve the 
former. We describe the foundation that builds to the Rational Method, and so, to 
the realization of any goal. The term ‘ration’ is introduces. We also show that 
ration is a singularity in space and time. 
                                                
1
 Conceptual Conglomerate is a reference to any specific of elusive system (may the latter be 
formed by elements, concepts or states). 
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We end the paper with different general remarks regarding true rationality. 
Moreover, we will answer throughout the paper to different questions that some of 
our colleagues pertinently ask. 
 
1.1. Traditional rationality 
Figure 3 of the Appendix illustrates the general ideas encompassed in 
rationality, what is known of ‘traditional rationality’. This map is a collection of 
previous works on the topic. Some characteristics of rational/TR are: way of 
thinking of individuals; framework; pattern of thinking; context dependent; choice 
dependent. 
Contemporary models use a reasonable approximation of what is rational 
when referring to TR. Moreover, the same models assume hyper-rationality, 
meaning that nothing can violate the actors’ preferences. There are few problems 
with hyper-rationality: actors’ preferences may be contradictory; preferences are 
dependent on nature, on the situation; constrains imposed on the actors change the 
initial preferences; framing. These are only a few of the difficulties that are 
introduced indirectly. 
For Rational Choice Theory (RCT), TR is the deliberation and finding the 
best course of action (using rationality in any form to distinguish from alternative 
actions). We see that this definition is extremely general. Another definition for 
TR is that RCT tries to predict what actual action will be taken. Nevertheless, the 
action aspect is only one part of rationality. Action is a consequence of the actor’s 
rationality. In other words, RCT evaluates the actions of actors as symptoms of 
their rationality, and not actually looking at the root of the canonical basis of 
rationality.  
We will show that even if the assumptions of TR have useful properties 
and characteristics, they are not accurate and create loopholes in models. For this 
reason, the latter do not represent accurately reality, the world.  
There are three general characteristics (definitions) that are attributed to 
TR and the actors that use TR (Straffin 1993, pp. 53-54): 
 
(1) Traditional Rational Player: A player is rational if it chooses the alternative 
that has the highest utility.  
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(2) Reverse Causality of TR: The reason why a player chooses a certain strategy 
is that the specific strategy has the highest utility. 
 
(3) Comparison of Utility: If Player 1 (P1) values an outcome higher than Player 
2 (P2), then P1 values more the outcome than P2.  
 
There is an important question that needs to be answered (Feinberg, 
2005a): is TR a property of the decision or of the decision maker? We remark that 
TR is not a property. It is a characteristic. The first definition of RCT puts an 
emphasis on the decision maker. Yet, the second definition puts it on the decision. 
Here, we see one aspect of TR relativity between models, and even internal to the 
same models. 
Moreover, Game Theory (GT) uses two major assumptions regarding the 
player (the rational player, an ideal person) (Damme 1983, pp. 1–2):  
 
(4) Assumption 1. The player can analyze the game, i.e. he is sufficiently 
intelligent.  
(5) Assumption 2. Von Neumann/Morgenstern’s utility function can express the 
player’s preferences. 
 
1.2. Other characteristics of Traditional Rationality  
Characterizing someone of rational or irrational is actually characterizing 
the latter’s conformity to the standards of rationality (Nathanson 1985, pp. 35).  
Nevertheless, these standards are unclear. Even though one may argue that (1), 
(4), and (5) form these principles, we do not believe so. We will see later that 
rationality does not have standards. It is a method. This is the reason why one 
cannot assign rationality, in the traditional sense of rationality, to anybody.  
Some consider rationality as the means (practical and efficient) to achieve an end. 
For these, there is no specified method of achieving the ‘desired’ end. “Achieving 
the end no matter the means” is pragmatism. It is true that in pragmatism there 
may be rationality (and vice-versa), but rationality is not limited only to 
pragmatism. 
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For a player to be rational, he or she needs experience. Ayer (Blanshard 
1962, pp. 25) argued that “‘being rational’ entails being guided in a particular way 
by past experience.”. However, experience is not only P1 having some action in 
some environment. Experience depicts a ConC that is more complicated. It is: 1. 
interaction with the environment; 2. it is acquiring information; 3. it is 
transforming this information into knowledge; 4. it is having the ability to reason 
and deliberate regarding the knowledge obtained. We will see in section 2.3 the 
different types of information and how the latter is transformed in beliefs and 
knowledge. For now, we point out that experience by itself is meaningless, unless 
there is a lesson to be learned from it. By learning, we understand the acquisition 
and ‘adaptation’ of concepts and patterns. We note that without learning, there is 
no rationalization.  
Moreover, the rationalists “have held that a belief or action is rational if it 
is based on skillfully carried out deliberations and that a person is rational to the 
degree that he tends to base his beliefs and actions on rational deliberation” 
(Nathanson 1985, pp. 37).  This definition of rational belief/action is evasive. 
Actions are rational to the extent that a person employs the rational methodology. 
As for rational beliefs, they are ‘rational’ if they are also reached through the 
rational methodology and have as foundation correct information and knowledge. 
 
1.3. Utility and equilibrium 
Having (1) through (5), we conclude that the player’s goal is to maximize 
the utility function and choose the strategy that guarantees this function. There is 
no other objective for the player.  
Davis (1970, pp. 52) stipulated that “an utility function is simply a 
‘quantification’ of a person’s preferences with respect to certain objects.”  
However, we have to note that ‘quantification’ is a construct. It is a scale for an 
object that holds a value over some range. The range can be set by the individual, 
by the opponent, by nature, or by the modeler.  
Moreover, utilities are personal. Therefore, how can one know what 
utilities and what utility function P1 has? In certain games (the prisoner’s 
dilemma, chicken, ultimatum game, matching pennies, stag hunt, etc.), it is the 
modeler that determines the utilities, and the utility function is always the same: 
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achieve the highest utility. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) 
have made advancements regarding different models that take in consideration the 
opponents perceptions and their influence on the utilities of the game. Moreover, 
Levine (1998) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have models that are more fair taking 
into account the opponents’ preferences in the utilities. In nature, the reasons for 
which individuals assign value to things can be demonstrated to be irrational (yet, 
irrationality is the antonym of rational; not knowing what rational is, we cannot 
determine what is irrational).  
In GT, the players do not determine the utility values. Values to different 
outcomes are assigned in the model, and the modeler assumes their independent 
utilities regarding the players. Again, we see that it is the modeler that determines 
the range of quantification. Yet, the utility values attributed in a game are personal 
and should not take in consideration the modeler. They should be independent 
from the modeler. 
Homo Economicus (HE) is self-interested and classifies rationality though 
his own utility-maximization decisions in a vacuum of norms and values. His 
norms and values are the only ones that exist. In other words, HE is rational in the 
sense that its welfare is defined by the optimization of the utility function of the 
perceived opportunities. Simply, HE is selfish. 
We know that many predictions of behavior that are based on HE do not 
work. When the assumption of HE was introduced in certain games, and these 
games yielded different results than those expected, researchers were surprised. 
The games that model HE behavior employ tautological assumptions to a certain 
degree. This is the first step in understanding why current theoretical models give 
different results than what would happen in reality. This is also the case for GT. 
Using (4) and the belief that actors believe that their opponents behave in the 
same manner as them (Feinberg, 2005, pp.97), we actually have two assumptions:  
 
(6) Assumption 3. P1: I am rational;   
(7) Assumption 4. From P1’s perspective, P2 is rational.  
 
Furthermore, Nash equilibrium (NE) has a universal ‘condition’ that it is 
the best response, assuming that the players are rational. Yet, the concept of NE is 
also determined by the modeler, because it is the latter that determines the utilities 
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of the players. There is some literature that stipulates that the Nash rational is not 
a necessary consequence of rationality, or a reasonable empirical proposition 
(Bernheim, 1984). Moreover, Pearce (1984) holds the view that for strategies to 
be rational, the NE is not necessary or sufficient. 
In a game where there is equilibrium, an NE, if one player deviates from 
the path of achieving the equilibrium, he is considered irrational, in the traditional 
sense of rationality. We note that TR is bivalent. There are two explanations for 
this deviation. 1) P1 (being the deviator) does not have the ability to reason about 
the achievement of equilibrium. He fails Assumption 1. In this case, equilibrium 
is the goal. 2) P1 does not want to achieve equilibrium.  Here, equilibrium is not a 
priority. Maybe P1 achieved his goal and for him, he is rational
2
.  The player may 
be satisfysing. From the modeler’s point of view, the player is not rational 
because he did not achieve equilibrium, and, in the same time, obstructed P2 to 
achieve it also. 
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern succeeded in demonstrating 
two things about … utilities. First, it is always possible in 
principle to convert a player’s consistent preferences among 
outcomes of a game into utilities. Secondly, if a player applies 
the principle of maximization …to the expected utilities rather 
than to the expected monetary values of the available 
strategies, then this player is in fact choosing according to his 
or her tastes. This is called the principle of maximizing 
expected utility. (Colman 1982, pp. 19–20) 
 
We notice that even von Newman and Morgenstern acknowledge the fact 
that utilities are theoretical. Propositions of utility of choice also fluctuate in time 
and environments. This is caused by the indirect influence of hyper-rationality. 
Moreover, when an actor frames an outcome, the former influences the utility of 
that outcome. 
 
                                                
2
 Traditional Rationality is relative. 
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1.4. Preferences and expectations 
We also have to note that preferences play a central roll in any theory that 
has the concept of TR as an element. In economics, preferences are said to be 
rational if and only if they are complete and transitive (actors can compare all 
alternatives and the comparisons are consistent). Using TR means that the actors 
will chose the most preferred option. However, if uncertainty is present, the 
independence axiom is added to the model. 
 
Independence axiom: If X > Y, then pX + (1 - p)Z > pY + (1 - p)Z for all Z and p 
∈ (0,1), where X, Y, Z are lotteries.3 
 
Rational expectations bridge the realm of expectations and the RCT 
framework. It is not the actions that are the main focus, but expectations of future 
events undergone by actors.  These future events are actually best guesses of the 
future taken in consideration all available information. Expectations are 
considered to be, under uncertainty, what is likely to happen. They can be realistic 
or not. Yet, these models say nothing about human behavior besides the fact that 
the actors behave ‘rationally’. 
The rational expectations model assumes that people do not make 
systematic errors when predicting the future. Any expectation that differs from the 
actual outcome is only random deviation. However, any expectation cannot be 
fully rational because the future cannot be predicted. Potential future events can 
only be partially predicted. 
Thus, using the methods described before, can we quantify rationality 
using (1) through (5)? If we are able to do so, how do we ‘quantify’ rationality, or 
the degree of rationality? TR, per se, cannot be quantified. TR is bivalent: an actor 
is rational or it is not.  There are no degrees of TR. One cannot be ‘more rational’ 
than another. Being defined as it is, TR is bounded by the choice of the highest 
utility and the Principle of TR (Stahl 1999, pp. 122). 
 
Principle of TR: Every player wishes to come out as well off as possible.  
                                                
3
 The independence axiom is attributed to Dr. P.A. Samuelson. Econometrica 1952 vol.20, 661-
679, has short but interesting contributions by H. Wold, G. L. S. Shackle, A. S. Manne, A. 
Charnes, E. Malinvaud, and  P. A. Samuelson regarding ‘strong independence axiom’. 
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The Principle of TR does not tell us anything about the method of 
achieving the highest welfare. For this reason, we state that the principle of TR is 
more like an aspiration than an actual principle. A player can incorporate this 
objective in its values. However, by doing so, the player would become HE.   
Newell (Newell 1982) uses a different principle of rationality with which we are 
partially in agreement: 
 
Newell principle of rationality (NPR): If an agent has knowledge that one of its 
actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action.  
 
2. Rational Method 
2.1. The goal 
We use the following definitions: 
 
Definition 1. A goal is a personal ‘target’ that an individual wants to accomplish 
given some standards.  
 
Definition 2. Rationality is a method of deliberation of achieving a specific goal.  
 
A goal is an abstract concept. It is an outcome that an individual attempts 
to transform in a fact. We note that an action per-se is not a goal, unless the goal is 
the specific action.   
For the rational method (RM), the Goal is to achieve a specific goal. It has 
no connection with maximizing the utility function, unless the latter is the goal. 
We remark that any strategy is a method. However, strategic approach for GT has 
no connection with cleverness. For us, as well as for the RM, cleverness means 
having the most efficient method of achieving a specific goal. We will discuss 
cleverness and intelligence in section 2.3. 
We also notice that common knowledge of rationality (CKR) is the 
assumption that the same definition of rationality is at work. Yet for TR, there is 
no information about what the other player wants and what standards of 
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rationality (models) are employed, except assumptions 3 and 4. Aumann’s 
definition of common knowledge (Aumann, 1976) cannot be employed in this 
case. Having RM, we may be tempted to use CKR as an assumption. In fact, 
Aumann’s CKR is knowledge in the RM framework. 
The choices that actors have are set to be modal-rational by nature; modal-
rational because ‘rationality’ is a goal driven method. One may have the goal (pi), 
but not the method of achieving it. In this case, pi is not a goal. It is a stationary 
potential future event4. 
A great deal of experimentation has confirmed that decision makers do not 
always behave according to laws of rationality5. GT incorporates these laws in its 
models in the manner we have seen. Therefore, GT’s architecture does not model 
real situations. GT yields conclusions that are not fully suitable in the real world. 
For this reason, we see the need to have a unified definition and methodology 
when analyzing rationality in any theory and model. And most importantly, we 
must have a definition that illustrates accurately real life situations and actors. 
 
2.2. Rational method 
Rationality is a method, and it is sequential. Figure 1 illustrates the fours 
steps that characterize the rational method.   
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                
4
 We have to note that a stationary potential future event is not necessarily an expectation. 
5
 The laws of rationality for GT, and even for RCT, are more assumptions than laws. A law is 
empirically tested (and retested), and the former represents accurately reality. 
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An individual sets himself a specific goal, pi. He must look for a method, 
λ, in order to achieve this goal. The individual may find multiple methods of 
achieving the goal. Once he finds the appropriate method, the individual must take 
the desired method. This methodology will ensure, but not guarantee, the 
achievement of the specific goal. Once the method is chosen, and it is enacted, 
Nature can put constrains in the achievement of the goal.  
We note that only after the completion of one of the steps, an individual 
moves to the subsequent step.   
This entire process is called true rationality or RM. We remark that it can 
be presumed that more efficient the path (the method) to achieve the goal, the 
higher the rationality. For the RM, as well as for the TR, there are no higher or 
lower degrees of rationality. For us, an individual uses RM or not. This 
assumption of higher degree of rationality is actually a measurement of the ability 
to reason, and it is not an assumption. We will see in section 2.3 how this ability 
to reason is characterized. 
As we stated before, we are partially in agreement with NPR. The reason 
is that the latter looks only at rm4. However, there are three other steps that need 
to be completed before arriving to the most efficient path to achieve a specific 
goal. Moreover, the first definition of TR in RTC also focuses only on rm4. 
 
Corollary 1: If rm1 to rm4, then we have the conclusion of the four steps, rmc. 
 
Without rm1, there is no RM because RM is a goal driven method. rm1 is 
considered the foundational element of the RM. Some may not even consider rm1 
a step in the RM. However, rm1 is existential to RM, therefore, incorporated in 
RM. rm2 is the internal thinking process of finding the set Λ of all available 
means of achieving a specific goal. Section 2.3 deals with this aspect. In rm3, Jack 
chooses λ out of set Λ. λ is linked to pi because λ is a mapping function to pi. The 
logical argument is: 
pi 
λ→pi 
λ 
∴pi, by Modus Ponens. 
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The effect of a method that leads to pi, is pi. 
We note that Nature is not present in Corollary 1.  
 
Corollary 2: If rm1 to rm4, and Nature d is present and diverges Jack from his 
path, then we have a partial rmc. 
 
For us, a partial rmc refers to a lower lever of pi that Jack reached. We 
point out that goals have different degrees due to satisfycing. 
Let Λ={λ1, λ2, λ3, …}, and f(λ) be a mapping function of λ to pi. Nature 
being present, we have fκ(λ), with κ power of deviation of Nature over f(λ). fκ(λ) 
= κpi. As κ is the power of influence, we set 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. If κ = 0, pi is not reached. If 
κ = 1, pi is reached because Nature d is not present. If 0 < κ < 1, pi is partially 
reached. We note that the deviation coefficient κ is inverse proportional to the 
influence of Nature d. 
In any system, as scientists, we have to take in consideration the 
environment. In our case, the environment is set as Nature. Any environment has 
its own limitations and liberties. Jack may have the appropriate method to achieve 
his goal. Because of last-moment influence of Nature, Jack is obstructed to fully 
reach his goal. In this case, Jack could have done nothing. One cannot blame him 
for not contemplating all aspects of the environment. An individual does not 
necessarily know how and to what degree the environment influences his method 
λ.  
 
Corollary 3: If rm1 without rm2 to rm4, and Nature s is supportive of Jack, then 
we have a partial rmc. 
 
This is the case when Jack sets himself a goal, but does not have time to 
engage in rm2 to rm4. There is a p probability of potential possibilities that this 
may happen in real life situations. Even if in most cases p is 0, we have to 
acknowledge this possibility. 
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The proof of Corollary 3 is a combination of the proof of Corollary 1 and 
Corollary 2, having g(s) as the mapping function to pi, and µ the support power of 
Nature. We note that µ is directly proportional to the influence of Nature s. 
 The probability of Corollary 3 is minimal. For this reason, this corollary 
can be neglected. However, we felt the necessity of stating it in order to have a 
complete understanding of the world. 
 
Theorem 1. The RM and Corollary 3 are the only ways to achieve a goal. 
 
Proof 1. Corollary 1 and 3 can be combined to provide the proof of this 
theorem. The same rational of Modus Ponens applies in this case also.   
Proof 2. a different proof is to use the reduction to absurdity argument. 
What ways are there to achieve pi? By the definition of the goal, it is the individual 
that attempts to transform an outcome in a fact. Therefore, Jack must actively be 
engaged in this process.  
Let us call pi a specific goal, and pi* a goal in general. pi* can be achieved 
by mistake, or by influence of Nature. However, there is no method involved, no 
RM. Also, Corollary 3 does not apply in this case because Jack did not intend to 
be actively involved in reaching the specific goal. pi* is not a specific goal. It is a 
wish. We have to notice that pi* may happen or not, depending on Nature. This 
type of nature is not Nature s, because pi* is not a specific goal, and RM does not 
apply in this case. 
An individual has to reach the threshold of willingness to achieve the goal. 
This is how wishes are transformed in goals. Reaching this threshold, which 
enables the drive to achieve the goal, is manifested by the work done through 
steps rm1 to rm4. 
The difference between pi and a wish is that a goal entails willingness to 
put effort in accomplishing it. A wish has no willingness of work involved.  
If the goal is achieved by other means, pi is not a goal per se.  
 
Lemma of theorem 1. The RM does not guarantee reaching the goal. 
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Proof. Using the RM ensures the path of achieving pi, but does not 
guarantee the actual achievement of pi. Reaching the goal is a future event. As 
stated before, future events cannot be fully predicted. Moreover, Nature is always 
present. This Lemma is a specific case of Corollary 2 where κ = 0.   
 
2.3. Schematics of RM to achieve pi 
 Having a rationality method is not enough. We also have to understand 
how Jack arrives to and uses the RM. We provide the subsequent schematic that is 
composed of the following ConCs: I – information; B – belief; K – knowledge; O 
– purpose; Ξ – actions; pi – goal (end result). All these ConCs are specific and 
relative to the individual.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Information can be acquired through different fashions. One of the most 
important ways is through experience, meaning through interaction, direct or 
indirect, with the environment.  
There are a few types of information that are interesting to us. Fresh 
information is the information that an individual is introduced to in the present. 
Sedimental information is the information that had time to store itself and create 
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either values or beliefs. Residue information is the information that did have time 
to sediment, but was neglected because it did not correspond with the values or 
beliefs of the individual. Concealed information is the information that an 
individual analyzed, but did not have time to sediment itself. All these types of 
information are looked at from the individual’s perspective. 
Using these types of information, an individual strives to enlarge the 
means set Λ, and eventually, coordinate between means and ends. 
A belief is a mental state, the result/conclusion of internal contemplation 
that manifests itself as an attitude vis-à-vis a concept. An important observation 
that psychology demonstrated is that information shapes beliefs. Thus, we state 
that Beliefs are derived from certain evidence or information. 
Through information and sound evidence of proper beliefs, knowledge is 
created. Moreover, one increases knowledge through cognitive processes. 
We remark that knowledge can have many meanings. For us, knowledge is 
information acquired directly, indirectly or deductively, and has a potential 
purpose. In other words, knowledge is information connected to intent, 
information that is ready to be used in an action. We note that the information 
transformed into knowledge enables a wider range of purposes. 
For us, purpose is the elementary motive in achieving an intention. 
Knowledge and beliefs enable purposes. We also notice that every purpose has its 
own knowledge and belief systems. 
 
Definition 3. An action is a state or process forming an organized activity in the 
course of accomplishing an objective. 
 
One essential property of actions is that they require at least one purpose. 
Ξ is the set of actions available to the individual. Jack must define his goal before 
one can suggest a course of action. In addition, actions are determined by 
purposes. Through deliberation, an individual uses different standards of 
knowledge and beliefs (through purposes) to consider possible actions. 
We point out that there are different potential actions available to reach a 
specific goal. One can use Occam’s razor to analyze them, however this is not 
necessary.  
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One must use its reason as the path from action to attainment of the goal 
of the action. The actual process of thinking from action to goal and vice-versa is 
called deliberation. The latter is a pattern of thoughts. The main question that Jack 
asks is How can I achieve this goal? There are three major types of reasoning 
(Hartshore 1958, vol.5, para. 145): 1. deductive, from general to particular; 2. 
inductive, from particular to general; and 3. abductive, from best available 
information to best explanation. 
In the end, the actions of a player determine the (full, partial, or 
unfulfilled) achievement of the desired goal. 
We have to note that the concept of intelligence is quite important in our 
process. Intelligence, for us, is the ‘expression’ of sets of principles that are 
complex in nature. This process enables us to model, predict and manipulate the 
environment at different degrees. We realize that the higher degree of intelligence 
would yield more options, more paths to achieve a goal. 
Through the description of the RM, we see that the goal and the 
achievement of the specific goal are the acumens of our approach. However, we 
have to notice that there are situations where the main goal is not achieved in a 
single attempt. Our RM can be employed for the achievement of any sub-goal. 
Accomplishing all the appropriate sub-goals, would lead the decision maker to his 
main goal. 
Deliberating, Jack uses all the information and knowledge that he has in 
order to achieve the goal. In analyzing and choosing his action(s), Jack must take 
in consideration possible intervention of outside factors once the action is taken. 
Nature imposes different situations. These situations may or may not have 
constraints. Depending on the environment (closed, open, controlled, etc.) in 
which Blue is, Nature can intervene at different degrees. It is Jack’s duty to 
foresee, at his best capacity and with the information available, possible 
influences of the environment. However, this does not mean that Blue must 
anticipate all variations in Nature. If Jack deviates from his goal because of 
outside intervention(s) of Nature, which Jack could have not anticipated, then 
Jack is not responsible for the failure. Moreover, Jack cannot be considered 
irrational. He used appropriately the RM. He may be consider as having a lower 
ability to reason, less intelligent, but not irrational. If however, he could have 
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anticipated Nature’s influence, then Jacktook the wrong decision, the wrong 
action. 
 
2.4. Ration 
The RM refers to the attainment of any goal. From one perspective, RM is 
self-interested because it looks at a goal that an actor has acknowledged. 
Moreover, the RM has no connection with moral or ethical values, just as HE. The 
principal drive for HE is the achievement of the highest welfare. For RM, it is the 
goal and the way to achieve this goal. The only manner that moral or ethical 
values can be incorporated is through the establishment of moral or ethical goals. 
We call ‘ration’ the ability to reason in the RM framework. 
 
Theorem 2.  Ration is a singularity in time and space.  
 
Proof. For every pi, the schematic apparatus of Figure 2 does not change, 
the skeleton of relations do not change. However, the content of the elements of 
the apparatus change. 
Through time, and therefore through experience, information changes; it 
enriches itself; beliefs change, disappear, or are reinforced; knowledge augments 
or decreases. All these elements determine shifts in purpose, and change the set Λ 
of available actions. 
Any change in space and time is a change in the experience. This is the 
logic why ration is a singularity, and it does never happen twice in the same 
manner.   
 
3. Further remarks 
3.1 Everything that we do, we do with a purpose, consecutively to achieve 
a goal. In order to achieve pi, there is a possibility that smaller goals, sub-goals, 
have to be accomplished sequentially. This is not contradictory to our RM. An 
individual uses our methodology to satisfy the particular sub-goals. The sub-goals 
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are treated as regular singular goals. Once all the appropriate sub-goals are 
archived, pi is achieved by default. 
We also note that all the rmiare sub-goals of RM. One must satisfy these 
sub-goals, in order to arrive at pi. 
3.2 Using the distribution axiom of modal logic where necessary (A→B)⇒ 
(necessary A → necessary B), we realize that if it is necessary that the RM leads 
to the accomplishment of a specific goal, then it is necessary to use the RM, 
which leads necessarily to the accomplishment of the specific goal. 
3.3 The RM has no link with preferences. As stated before, preferences 
play a central role in any theory or model that deals with traditional rationality. 
We have demonstrated that true rationality is a method. If one is to employ any 
method, one cannot look at its own preferences while using the method. An 
individual has preferences regarding certain goals. However, the RM does not 
distinguish between them and does not form any utilities regarding these goals. 
Once Jack decides the ‘preference’ of a goal, he must take the RM in order to 
accomplish that goal. Preferences are outside the RM. 
 
3.4 Observation: Ration has no principles outside of RM.  
We state that a principle is the fundamental component of a set of rules or 
standards. Ration is an ability, the ability to reason in a precise framework. This 
framework is the RM. Our methodology has operational principles. However, any 
other principle that is outside RM cannot be incorporated in this framework while 
keeping the operational value intact.  Any moral or ethical principles that a player 
has can be incorporated only in the pursuit of ethical or moral goals. Again, the 
RM does not state anything about moral or immoral goals, just how goals can be 
achieved. However, ethics can be and are incorporated by the ethical individual as 
boundaries or standards of the actions available. 
3.5 We feel obliged to respond to Feinberg (2005b) regarding ‘maximum amount 
of rationality’ (MAR). We have seen that rationality is bivalent and therefore, 
MAR cannot exist. Yet, Jack may refer to different degrees of ration because the 
ability to reason has different degrees. As stated before, having more information, 
more knowledge would increase the ability to reason, thus giving it different 
scales. 
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3.6 
While economic man maximizes ... administrative man, 
(organization man) satisfices…. Human beings … satisfice 
because they have not the wits to maximize. (Stahl 1999, pp. 
122) 
 
People satisfice because it is easier, and because their ability to reason 
varies. From an economic perspective, satisficing is the acumen of an individual 
to achieve a minimal level of a goal, the minimal value of that goal. Jack is not 
attempting to get the maximum possible value. He just wants to be content. For 
our purposes, we say that the players use bounded ration, where some limits are 
put on ration for various reasons. Satisficing is a conditional ration, which is any 
constrain on ration or on the methodology to achieve a specific goal. Most of the 
time these conditions are imposed by nature. 
 
4. Conclusion 
a. We recognize rationality as a super-system concept, a conceptual 
conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, 
experience, and pragmatism interact. 
Rationality is both a method and a sequence. The Rational Method is 
characterized by four steps. Showing the sequence and quantifying it enables us to 
have a mathematical model for rationality. This mathematical model enables us to 
determine the level of reason that a player uses. Moreover, our working definition 
of rationality can be quantifiable.  
As in real situations, Nature is present, and we have to take it in 
consideration. We demonstrated that if one employs the rational method, one 
would reach the desired goal. We also showed that Nature can be either beneficial 
or detrimental. In both cases, we illustrated the different scenarios. With or 
without Nature’s influence, we have proven that our rational methodology is the 
only manner to reach a goal. However, if Nature fully diverges with the scope of 
the individual, the RM does not ensure the accomplishment of a player’s goal. 
We also have described the network of elements that interact in the reasoning 
process of an individual. Information plays the first step in the achievement of a 
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goal. Our actions are determined by information, beliefs, knowledge and 
purposes. Moreover, our actions determine the fulfillment of a desired goal.  
We described ration as the ability of reasoning using the rational method frame. 
We realize that ration, as well as any other thinking process, is a singularity in 
space and time. 
b. Decision opportunity is frequent; however, taking the ‘right’ decision 
can be disputed. What would be considered as the right decision? For us, the right 
decision is a decision that reaches the desired goal, taking the appropriate method. 
If an alternative does not lead to the desired goal, then the decision is wrong.  
It is a fact that people do mistakes. There are a few explanations which are equal 
in importance and latter research should take them in consideration. People take 
wrong decisions because they have wrong information; because they use wrong 
assumptions; because they have a low ability to reason; because the methods used 
in rationality are not the appropriate ones. Should we consider these people 
irrational? Or, do our models that try to explain the world are out of focus and do 
not explain the world accurately? Irrational people are not taken out of the game 
(as some may argue). They play games also, because they are in social situations 
as well. 
 
Postulate: Any individual that is in a situation plays a game. 
 
c. We point out that the majority of economists are faith-based, using 
Assumption 1, instead of being realistic. The evidence drawn from current 
rational choice models points to a very important fact: RCT is limited and it is 
ideal. 
  The current TR models that are used are incomplete because they use 
partial definitions. Being incomplete, some of their definitions should not be 
assumed or believed. These partial definitions are only small pieces of a greater 
puzzle. What we tried to do in this paper is to complete the picture by putting all 
the pieces together in order to be able to move on a higher level/dimension to 
perceive the ensemble view. The result is having a unified understanding and 
theory of what is true rationality: it is a method. 
d. Having a unilateral definition of rationality, we surpass one major 
obstacle preventing the development of any authoritarian unified theory.  
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Furthermore, different models and theories now have a common ground on which 
we can judge their soundness. 
 
Appendix 
MAP OF TRADITIONAL RATIONALITY 
 
Figure 3 
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